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I. INTRODUCTION
N 1971, Richard Posner, then a young professor at the University of
Chicago Law School, published a short article proposing an enforce-
ment program for the Justice Department's Antitrust Division.' Pos-
ner drew on the scholarship of the Chicago School and on his own early
writings to construct a program that would, he argued, deploy the
agency's scarce resources most efficiently. Economic efficiency was the
original goal of the Sherman Act, according to Posner,2 and provided a
clear and operational basis for administrative discretion. The Antitrust
Division thus should seek "to maximize the efficiency of antitrust en-
forcement by discovering and implementing those policies whose net so-
*Alumni Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
** J. Will Young Professor of Law, Mississippi College of Law. We thank Roger Blair
and Mike Vita for thoughtful comments on prior drafts.
1. Richard A. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 500
(1971) [hereinafter A Program].
2. Id. at 504-05. Posner followed the reading of legislative history in Robert H. Bork,




cial product is largest."' 3 His criterion for identifying inefficient practices
was economic consensus: What practices do mainstream economists
agree reduce the value of output?4 Posner argued that "there is enough
common ground among economists on the monopoly question to provide
an ample as well as secure base for a program of antitrust enforcement."'5
Applying the consensus/efficiency standard, Posner concluded that the
Antitrust Division ("Division") should focus its efforts exclusively on car-
tels and practices ancillary to them; horizontal mergers that substantially
increase market concentration; and regulatory reform. 6 He specifically
excluded cases challenging exclusionary practices that do not involve
agreements among competitors. He thus opposed devoting resources to
"vertical and conglomerate mergers, arrangements subject to Section 3 of
the Clayton Act (unless imposed by a conspiracy among competing
firms), many single-firm monopolization cases such as the pending suit
against IBM, and many resale price maintenance cases."'7 As Posner con-
ceded, this application of the consensus standard obviously favored the
Chicago School's more restrictive view of appropriate antitrust
enforcement.
Posner's article attempted to use the economic and organizational the-
ory of the time to frame a coherent administrative program. However,
much has occurred in antitrust law and economics in the years since Pos-
ner's article was published. We propose here to reexamine the recom-
mendations of Posner's article in light of the experience of the past
quarter-century in enforcement, caselaw, and scholarship. Although we
agree with Posner's efficiency standard, our criteria will differ from Pos-
ner's in several respects. When Posner wrote his article, the Division's
range of choice in litigation policy was considerably broader than it is
now. The Supreme Court was extraordinarily receptive to novel theories
of liability;8 in merger enforcement, as Justice Stewart famously observed,
the government always won.9 In such an environment, it made sense to
consider only economic consensus in selecting from the range of available
theories of liability. Now, however, the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts, in part because of the Chicago School's writings and in
part because of Republican appointments, have become more critical of
3. Posner, supra note 1, at 501.
4. Id. at 506-13. Posner noted that the economics profession is "deeply divided" on
issues critical to reducing the goal of efficiency to a set of useable guidelines and that the
Assistant Attorney General is not competent to resolve the academic debate. By consen-
sus of professional opinion, Posner meant "a very substantial majority position (with mere
numbers weighted by experience and distinction) .... Id. at 507.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 507-08.
7. Id. at 508-09 (internal citations omitted).
8. See generally William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust,
44 EMORY L.J. 1 (1995).
9. "The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government
always wins." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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assertions of antitrust liability.' 0 Thus, in considering changes in the Divi-
sion's enforcement policy, it is necessary to consider judicial consensus as
well. Experience demonstrates that some areas of enforcement are un-
likely to meet with success and thus do not warrant a commitment of
resources.
The courts' skepticism toward antitrust charges flows to some extent
from their endorsement of the Chicago School position that consumer
welfare is the objective of the law." Few would now argue that the law is
designed to protect competitors. It is thus surprising that Assistant At-
torney General Anne Bingaman, in her essay in this Symposium, empha-
sizes the benefits to competitors from the only two recent enforcement
actions she discusses, those against the Bell System and Pilkington. 12
One other factor should affect the Division's choice of cases. Posner
wrote that the Division "should consider the ability and willingness of
private plaintiffs to obtain adequate relief, now that private antitrust ac-
tions have become, to say the least, highly feasible."'1 3 When Posner
made this observation, doctrines that limited private antitrust enforce-
ment, such as antitrust injury and standing,' 4 were not well developed.
Public enforcement policy should now take account of these doctrines in
evaluating whether private enforcement will be sufficient to deter ineffi-
cient practices.
10. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Charac-
terization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1300 (1989);
see generally William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s,
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (1991).
11. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 427 (rev. ed. 1993) (concluding
that judges in the 1980s by and large adopted an efficiency model of antitrust); see generally
John E. Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and Modern Antitrust: A Snug Fit, 40 ANTITRUST BULL.
1, 23-45 (1995) (discussing the evolution of antitrust analysis in the Supreme Court culmi-
nating in adoption of the efficiency standard).
12. She "underscore[s]" her "basic point" that the direct beneficiaries of the govern-
ment's action against AT&T were the firm's competitors, and she explains that the action
against the British glass manufacturer Pilkington opened up foreign markets to rival Amer-
ican firms. In 1990, Donald Dewey perhaps presciently predicted a swing in antitrust en-
forcement back toward an emphasis on the protection of small competitors. DONALD
DEWEY, THE ANTITRUST EXPERIMENT IN AMERICA 39 (1990). Dewey observed that the
Reagan administration moved "antitrust in the direction of contemporary blue-ribbon
opinion in economics," what Posner termed consensus. Id. But he guessed that the Rea-
gan course would not be maintained in future administrations, citing an abiding national
suspicion of "big business" and the populist impulse in American politics. Id.
13. Posner, supra note 1, at 524.
14. The modem antitrust injury doctrine was formally recognized in Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (holding lost profits of competitors of
merging firms not compensable). The Court's most recent treatment of antitrust injury is
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 (1990) (stating "a plaintiff
can recover only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the de-
fendant's behavior"). See generally William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust
Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1445 (1985); William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Eco-
nomic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1980). For a
discussion of earlier efforts to restrict private enforcement, see Milton Handler, Changing
Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 979, 989-1004 (1977).
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We apply these criteria in the pages that follow to Posner's recommen-
dations concerning express and tacit collusion, mergers, and single-firm
exclusionary practices. 15 We find that enforcement policy in the past
twenty-five years followed the broad outlines (and in some instances, the
details) of Posner's suggested approach. The Chicago approach has influ-
enced the enforcement programs of the Division and, to a lesser extent,
the Federal Trade Commission.16 Developments in legal doctrine and
economic theory support no radical changes in course, particularly in the
case of mergers and exclusionary practices. But, while the emphasis on
cartels should continue, Posner's suggested enforcement policy toward
express and tacit collusion must be revised in important ways.
II. CARTELS
Posner argued in A Program that the Division's primary concern
should be cartels. 17 But he criticized the law's traditional approach to
cartels, which focused almost exclusively on explicit communications be-
tween competitors to establish a conspiracy. Relying on his earlier, mas-
sive study of oligopoly, 18 Posner argued that "what the law is actually
punishing is the attempt to fix prices"' 9 rather than actual cartelization.
15. We limit our discussion of regulatory reform to this footnote. Posner's article
strongly endorsed the policy, instituted by Assistant Attorney General Donald Turner, of
advocacy of competition before regulatory agencies. Posner, supra note 1, at 529-31. The
Division still strongly supports this policy. 60 Minutes with Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant
Attorney Genera Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 323,
331-36 (1994) [hereinafter Bingaman]; 28 C.F.R. § 0.40(b) & (g) (1993); William E.
Kovacic, Built to Last? The Antitrust Legacy of the Reagan Administration, 35 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 244 (1988) (discussing competition advocacy during Reagan administration).
On the FTC, see Arnold C. Celnicker, The Federal Trade Commission's Competition and
Consumer Advocacy Program, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 379 (1989). The Division has recently
promulgated Intellectual Property Guidelines. 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing
of Intellectual Property, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) i 13,132. Moreover, the
Division continues to advocate competitive regulatory policies, particularly in the agricul-
ture, transportation, and energy fields. Jade Alice Eaton, Recent United States Department
of Justice Actions in the Electric Utility Industry, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 857 (1994) ("In gen-
eral, in comments to regulatory commissions, the Department argues that wherever possi-
ble, the agency should adopt policies that rely on market mechanisms instead of legal
mandate.").
One might argue that, after the deregulation of the Reagan years, there is less need for
competitive advocacy because there is a greater awareness of the value of markets in the
regulatory agencies. It is certainly not as obvious now as it was to Posner in 1971 that
"[tjhe most serious cartelization is found in the regulated industries." Posner, supra note 1,
at 529. Nevertheless, there are politically sensitive areas, such as agriculture, international
trade, and defense procurement, in which continuing advocacy of competition is needed.
William B. Burnett & William E. Kovacic, Reform of United States Weapons Acquisition
Policy: Competition, Teaming Agreements, and Dual-Sourcing, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 249, 308
(1989).
16. See Timothy Brennan, Content, Controversy, and Control: Politics and the Evolu-
tion of Antitrust Enforcement, 14 LAW & POL'Y 107, 109 (1992); William E. Kovacic, Fed-
eral Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Tw'o Cheers for the Disappearance
of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 REs. L. & ECON. 173, 178-82 (1989).
17. Posner, supra note 1, at 513, 529.
18. Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
19. Posner, supra note 1, at 514.
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Such an approach is only marginally related to a coherent policy aimed at
wealth maximization: "Many attempts to fix price may have negligible
consequences, while much serious price fixing may escape detection alto-
gether because proof of overt communication is normally required to es-
tablish an attempt but such communication may not always be necessary
to effectuate price fixing."'20 Consequently, the Division should examine
economic evidence to determine which cases are most economically sig-
nificant, even when evidence of communication is missing. Posner did
not argue that the Division should abstain from bringing traditional price-
fixing cases, only that it should supplement them with cases based on eco-
nomic proof, "not only so that the Division can distinguish between the
abortive attempt to fix prices and the successful, but also so that it can
proceed against violations that cannot be detected or proved by the older
methods alone."'21 In this Part, we consider the continuing vitality of Pos-
ner's proposals on collusion.
A. TACIT COLLUSION
In arguing for prosecution of tacit cartels, Posner necessarily rejected
the interdependence theory of oligopoly in favor of George Stigler's tacit
collusion theory.22 Under the interdependence theory, oligopolists
achieve the benefits of collusion by simply recognizing their mutual self-
interest and unilaterally deciding to charge supracompetitive prices; 23
under the tacit collusion theory, noncompetitive prices can only be main-
tained, absent express agreement, by tacit coordination of price and pro-
duction decisions.24 The policy implications of the two theories differ
radically: If noncompetitive behavior is simply the result of mutual recog-
nition of self-interest, then imposing penalties or issuing injunctions
against purported offenders is ineffectual; only deconcentration of the
market will restore competition. If, on the other hand, at least tacit collu-
sion is necessary to coordinate production and prices, then the individual
practices that permit the collusion may be enjoined or deterred.
Posner recommended that the Division look for serious collusion using
a two-step process. First, it should identify "those markets whose charac-
teristics predispose them toward price fixing."'25 As Posner developed at
greater length elsewhere, 26 those characteristics include: few sellers with
high market shares; many buyers with low market shares; no good prod-
uct substitutes; infrequent entry; a homogeneous and standardized prod-
uct; and a history of collusion. Once such a market is identified, the
Division should apply "certain tests in the suspect markets to determine
20. Id
21. Id at 523.
22. Id. at 509-10.
23. See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 114 (2d ed. 1968).
24. See George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUS-
TRY 39 (1968).
25. Posner, supra note 1, at 515.
26. Posner, supra note 18, at 1569-75 & 1603-04.
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whether output was likely to be restricted significantly. ' 27 In this step,
the Division should look for market shares of leading firms that are de-
clining in absolute terms, but stable relative to each other; price discrimi-
nation; industry-wide resale price maintenance; exchanges of price
information; and some forms of price and output changes.
Posner cautioned that courts may initially have difficulty assimilating
the sort of proof he identified. Nevertheless, if the Division adopted the
program as a guide to enforcement, economic evidence "would play an
increasingly important part in the trial as well as selection of antitrust
cases."'28 Posner candidly admitted, however, that:
I own to considerable doubt, shared by economists with whom I have
discussed the matter, that either step is fully practicable in the pres-
ent state of economic knowledge. But the alternative of continuing
to rely exclusively on the attempt approach seems to me even more
dismal, and I can see no harm in experimenting with a new
approach.29
Posner's recommendation, and similar ones, have been given a fair test
over the past twenty-five years. During the late 1970s, the Division,
under Assistant Attorney General John Shenefield, pursued a number of
shared monopoly investigations, based in part on section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.30 These investigations, including one of watthour meters rec-
ommended by one of us (Page) while he was a trial attorney, drew
heavily on Posner's recommendations concerning predisposing character-
istics. None of the investigations led to the filing of a case, either civil or
criminal. 31
The FrC also suffered an early defeat.32 In Ethyl the FTC found that
the parallel, unilateral adoption of practices like delivered pricing and
price protection clauses, in a market that exemplified Posner's predispos-
ing characteristics, constituted an unfair method of competition under
section 5 of the FTC Act.33 The Second Circuit rejected the FTC's con-
clusion, holding that the FTC must ordinarily show something approach-
27. Posner, supra note 1, at 515. See also id. at 516 n.50 (discussion of these factors
superseded the discussion in Posner, supra note 18, at 1578-83).
28. Id. at 524.
29. Id. at 501.
30. Antitrust Division Memorandum on Identification and Challenge of Parallel Pric-
ing Practices in Concentrated Industries, [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 874, at F-1 (May 26, 1978) (memorandum from John F. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division); George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust
Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1982).
31. Gregory J. Werden, Price Fixing and Civil Damages: Setting the Record Straight, 34
ANTITRUST BULL. 307, 334 n.84 (1989) (in Shenefield's project, all industries with 4-firm
concentration of over 40% were identified and many investigated, but "the project just
faded away").
32. Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983). Posner and Easterbrook later observed that
the industry remained competitive. See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK,
ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 41-43 (1984-85 Supp.
1984).
33. Id.; see generally Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Analysis of
Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis. L. REV. 887.
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ing a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act in order to establish a
violation of section 5.34 It had failed to do so, the court said, because
each of the practices was independently beneficial, both to the respon-
dents and to consumers. 35
After Ethyl the idea of pursuing tacit collusion by the use of economic
evidence fell into disfavor. More recently, however, the approach has
shown some signs of life in more restricted contexts. 36 In 1990, in Petro-
leum Products, the Ninth Circuit found that parallel price signaling, paral-
lel pricing, and direct contacts, in the absence -of a valid business
justification, could justify an inference of conspiracy. 37 The Division has
since obtained a consent decree in a case challenging the exchange of
price information through computerized reservation systems,38 and the
FTC has obtained settlements in cases alleging practices that facilitated
collusive bidding in the infant formula market.39 There has also been
some renewed interest in challenging the use of price-protection clauses,
which were found lawful in Ethyl.40
Although Posner expressed misgivings about the use of economic evi-
dence in a broad-based challenge to tacit collusion in the American econ-
omy, he suggested that it "may be unduly pessimistic" to say that "we
simply do not know enough about cartelization" to prosecute them by
anything other than traditional conspiracy cases.41 Experience has shown
that Posner's misgivings were well-founded. Tacit collusion is neverthe-
less collusion and, regardless of the doctrinal label, requires proof of an
agreement. Despite the courts' increased sophistication in the use of eco-
nomic data, proof of an agreement from parallel behavior, without com-
munication between the competitors, remains extraordinarily difficult. 42
The defendants' parallel use of facilitating practices will normally be in-
34. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
35. The FTC also issued a complaint under § 5 challenging oligopolistic behavior in
the breakfast cereals market, and seeking structural relief, but later abandoned the case
under Congressional pressure. In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 269 (1982) (denying appeal
of dismissal and vacating initial decision). Though the FTC's action showed a willingness
to challenge oligopoly in the absence of express collusion, Posner would probably not have
endorsed the case.
36. See Joseph Kattan, Beyond Facilitating Practices: Price Signaling and Price Protec-
tion Clauses in the New Antitrust Environment, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (1994).
37. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906
F.2d 432, 446-47 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991).
38. United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70, 410
(D.D.C.).
39. Susan S. DeSanti & Ernest A. Nagata, Competitor Communications: Facilitating
Practices or Invitations to Collude? An Application of Theories to Proposed Horizontal
Agreements Submitted for Antitrust Review, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 100-03 (1994).
40. See Kattan, supra note 36.
41. Posner, supra note 1, at 515.
42. Jonathan B. Baker, Introduction to Symposium on Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1, 2 (1993). On proving price fixing, see William E. Kovacic, The Identification and
Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1993);
Randall David Marks, Can Conspiracy Theory Solve the 'Oligopoly Problem'?, 45 MD. L.
REV. 387 (1986); Hays Gorey, Jr. & Henry A. Einhorn, The Use and Misuse of Economic
Evidence in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases, 12 J. CONTEMp. L. 1 (1986).
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conclusive, because such practices typically have business justifications.
Economic theory ordinarily does not resolve the ambiguity because econ-
omists differ about the effects of most facilitating practices.43 Conse-
quently, courts generally, and understandably, require some evidence of
communication between competitors in order to find an illegal
agreement.
This is not to say, of course, that Posner's recommendations concerning
economic evidence have had no lasting value. As we will see in the fol-
lowing Parts, the recommendations affect the analysis of mergers and ex-
clusionary practices because they help evaluate the probability that a
practice will reduce competition. For the same reasons, they affect the
interpretation of other horizontal restraints. In those cases in which there
is communication, economic evidence can be useful in inferring an agree-
ment on price."4 In those cases in which there is undoubted joint action,
economic evidence can assist in characterizing the agreement.45 The
price-signaling cases we mentioned earlier46 offer an example of the use-
fulness of economic evidence in the characterization of horizontal re-
straints. Posner argued in A Program that the information exchange
cases of the 1920s were wrongly decided largely because they ignored
market characteristics. 47 The exchange program found unlawful in Amer-
ican Column48 was probably benign because the firms involved were nu-
merous and controlled only a small share of the market. The program
upheld in Maple Flooring,49 however, was more suspicious because the
firms were far fewer, controlled seventy percent of the market, and had a
history of explicit price fixing. Any information exchange case brought
today would take account of the economic factors Posner identified.
B. EXPRESS COLLUSION AND INVITATIONS TO COLLUDE
The demise of tacit collusion led the Division to reemphasize tradi-
tional criminal price-fixing prosecutions.5 0 During the Reagan adminis-
43. Keith J. Crocker & Thomas P. Lyon, What Do "Facilitating Practices" Facilitate?
An Empirical Investigation of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Natural Gas Contracts, 37
J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1994); Steven C. Salop, Practices That (Credibly) Facilitate Oligop-
oly Co-ordination, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 265
(Joseph Stiglitz & Frank Mathewson eds., 1986).
44. Constance K. Robinson, Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, Antitrust Division, Communications Among Competitors-When Does the Depart-
ment of Justice Challenge, Comments delivered at the ABA Antitrust Law Section,
Advanced Antitrust Continuing Legal Education Inst. (Oct. 14-15, 1993), reprinted in 7
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,119 at 48,949 (Oct. 26, 1993).
45. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITS PRACIICE 180 (1994) ("In all cases involving ambiguous practices-that is,
practices that are plausibly either competitive or anticompetitive-it is wise to look first at
structural evidence.").
46. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
47. Posner, supra note 1, at 518 n.58.
48. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
49. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
50. Charles F. Rule, Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Targeting Naked
Cartel Restraints, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 257, 260-63 (1988); Judy Whalley, Priorties and Prac-
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tration, the Division brought more cases with greater success than ever
before. The Division brought 404 criminal cases between 1980 and 1984,
up from 136 in 1975-79, and 92 in 1970-74.51 Although the number of
prosecutions dipped to 296 in 1985-89, it has continued at a high level
during the late Bush and Clinton administrations.52
This renewed emphasis on criminal price-fixing cases raises another is-
sue. After the experience of the past quarter-century, the Division
should not expend substantial resources in the search for tacit collusion.
But it does not follow that the Division should devote far greater re-
sources to express price fixing. Posner criticized traditional price-fixing
cases for focusing on attempts to fix prices rather than the completed
practice. This criticism suggests that at least some express price fixing is
unsuccessful and therefore harmless.
In the classic formulation of the per se rule against price fixing, "[i]t is
the 'contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce' which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity
be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the
other. '' 53 The justification for this focus lies in the particularly harmful
nature of price fixing: "Whatever economic justification particular price-
fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an
inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their
actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the econ-
ony."' 54 Posner argued, however, that firms may mistakenly try to engage
in price fixing, even where it is unlikely to be successful, and "such mis-
takes, even if rare, could account for a large proportion of the small
number of price-fixing cases that the enforcement agencies bring."'55
Moreover, the mistakes may not be so rare if the rewards are high
enough and the risks of failure or apprehension are low. 56 Finally, bring-
ing cases against unsuccessful price fixing diverts resources from truly
harmful practices.5 7
If Posner is correct that attempted price fixing is often inconsequential,
then pursuit of all such cases may be unproductive. Posner's argument
rests on an empirical assumption about the size of the output restriction
in criminal price-fixing cases brought under traditional methods of proof.
If trivial cases represent a substantial proportion of the total, then merely
increasing the number of indictments could be unjustified. One study
tices- The Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program and Case Selection, 57 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 569, 569-72 (1988).
51. See Joseph C. Gallo et al., Criminal Penalties Under the Sherman Act: A Study of
Law and Economics, 16 REs. LAW & ECON. 25, 29 (1994).
52. See Bingaman, supra note 15, at 329-30 (84 cases filed in previous year).
53. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Posner, supra note 1, at 514.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 515.
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confirms Posner's analysis.58 It found that almost one-half of the Justice
Department's cases were not followed by civil suits for damages, even
though the costs of private suits in such cases should be relatively low.
The authors explain the low incidence of follow-on suits by suggesting
that the Division challenges cartels that are unlikely to succeed in restrict-
ing output.
Others disagree that the available data suggest that a substantial per-
centage of price-fixing prosecutions penalize harmless conduct. Gregory
Werden convincingly challenges the statistical basis for the earlier study
and points out that follow-on suits may not occur for a host of reasons
unrelated to the social harm associated with the offense.5 9 He observes
that proving price fixing, particularly beyond a reasonable doubt, is ex-
traordinarily difficult, normally requiring the direct testimony of an im-
munized conspirator. 60 Moreover, although one may estimate the overall
harm from price fixing,61 it is difficult to tell before a case is filed,
whether a particular conspiracy caused harm. Given that ineffective hori-
zontal price fixing is a socially useless activity and the Division has the
resources to prosecute every criminal price-fixing case that it can prove, it
is pointless and harmful to add any further legal requirements to the gov-
ernment's case.62
The emphasis on hard-core price fixing under traditional standards
seems justified. It is the most concealable of antitrust offenses-one re-
cent study estimates that between thirteen percent and seventeen percent
of cartels are detected.63 If successful in reducing output, it is the most
unequivocally harmful antitrust offense and, even if unsuccessful, it is un-
productive. Thus, the reallocation of resources to prosecute other of-
fenses is unlikely to increase social welfare. As we have seen, it is
unlikely that the pursuit of tacit collusion will be successful; nor would
enhanced merger enforcement, which is premised on reducing the mere
probability of collusion, be more likely to prevent harmful collusion. It
follows that greater deterrent penalties and greater resources devoted to
detection of express cartels are appropriate.
58. Howard P. Marvel et al., Price Fixing and Civil Damages: An Economic Analysis,
40 STAN. L. REV. 561 (1988).
59. See Werden, supra note 31, at 314-25 & 325-31 (payments may have been made
without litigation; defendants may have been judgment proof (and often are because such
defendants are least likely to be deterred by the threat of penalties); the action may have
been barred by limitations; suits may have been brought against co-conspirators prose-
cuted in separate criminal cases; suits may have been brought in state court under state
antitrust law; or proof of damage may have been difficult because the defendants pleaded
nolo, depriving private plaintiffs of prima facie evidence of harm).
60. Id. at 332 n.80. Inexperienced Division lawyers are also often badly outgunned.
See William W. Horen, GE Crushes the Trustbusters, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1995, at 57.
61. One recent study accepted a figure of 10% as the average markup in government
price-fixing cases. Gallo et al., supra note 51, at 67 n.93.
62. Werden, supra note 31, at 334-35.
63. Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting
Caught, 48 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 531-36 (1991).
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If price-fixing agreements that are unsuccessful in raising prices should
be prosecuted, what about efforts to fix prices that are unsuccessful even
in reaching an agreement? The question is particularly pertinent in light
of American Airlines,64 in which the Reagan Antitrust Division success-
fully argued that a mere offer to fix prices by the president of a major
airline was a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, where the market
shares of the interlocutors were high and entry was difficult. In addition,
the Division has obtained mail fraud convictions for the use of the mails
in attempts to fix prices65 and the FTC has challenged naked invitations
to collude under section 5 of the FTC Act.
66
Under one view of Posner's analysis, cases like these are inappropriate
because they represent mere attempts to fix prices. Nevertheless, they
may be justified under Posner's approach if market conditions suggest
that actual collusion is likely. A naked invitation to collude is, after all, a
particularly suspicious form of communication between rivals. It may be
"a special type of facilitating practice involving signaling. In an oligo-
polistic market, a solicitation can facilitate tacit collusion by signaling the
solicitor's intentions as well as [providing] a benchmark for future pricing
or output behavior. '67 Assuming that the market meets sufficiently strin-
gent standards of predisposing characteristics, such cases may be
justified.68
C. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
Resale price maintenance was illegal per se when Posner wrote A Pro-
gram and still is.69 Nevertheless, Posner classified the practice as a single-
firm abuse,70 unless it is adopted on an industry-wide basis.71 In the lat-
64. United States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed,
474 U.S. 1001 (1985).
65. See United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Bruil, No. 3761A, summarized in 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,091 (Jan. 17,
1991) (complaint) and 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) '1 70,290 (June 30, 1993) (sentencing).
66. DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 39, at 103-13; Thomas C. Wilcox, Beyond the Pale of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts: The Federal Trade Commission's "Invitation to Collude"
Doctrine as a Deterrent to Violations of the Antitrust Laws, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 623
(1994).
67. DeSanti & Nagata, supra note 39, at 105. As Phillip Areeda has observed, "a
solicitation to raise prices in concert may reduce [rivals'] uncertainty, either by setting a
target price or by raising confidence that rivals will follow." 6 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST LAW I 1419d, at 117 (1986). See also David G. Friedman, Impossibility, Subjective
Probability, and Punishment for Attempts, 20 J. LEo. STUD. 179 (1991) (arguing that at-
tempts to commit offenses that cannot possibly be completed should be punished on deter-
rence grounds where the offender is subjectively uncertain whether the offense will
succeed).
68. Proof of predisposing characteristics may be necessary on constitutional grounds
as well. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the
First Amendment, 43 KAN. L. REV. 163 (1994).
69. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 720,724 (1988);
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). For
recent criticism of the current legal framework, see Glen 0. Robinson, Explaining Vertical
Agreements: The Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method, 80 VA. L. REv. 577 (1994).
70. Posner, supra note 1, at 508 n.17.
71. Id at 520-21.
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ter case, it is one of several factors that may suggest tacit horizontal collu-
sion. Under Posner's analysis, then, the Division should ignore simple
resale price maintenance, except in the context of collusion, even though
the practice is illegal per se. The Division took this advice to heart in the
Reagan and Bush administrations. In those years, it prosecuted no resale
price maintenance cases and even argued for abandonment of the per se
rule.72 The Clinton administration has signaled a somewhat more activist
approach, revoking the Vertical Restraints Guidelines73 and obtaining at
least one consent decree prohibiting the practice.74
Renewed enforcement efforts against resale price maintenance could
be justified under the logic that "[v]ertical price-fixing is per se illegal.
We're going to enforce the law."'75 But such efforts cannot be justified
under the criterion that the Division should seek "to maximize the effi-
ciency of antitrust enforcement by discovering and implementing those
policies whose net social product is largest. '76 Certainly, economic con-
sensus does not favor renewed enforcement. Although some economists
believe that resale price maintenance may reduce welfare,77 many, per-
haps a majority, believe that it is procompetitive except in rare cases.78 A
recent empirical study found that collusion theories were incapable of
explaining at least eighty-five percent of the cases of resale price mainte-
nance in the sample and that efficiency-enhancing agency theories were
"plausible explanations for virtually all cases."'79 In addition, the inade-
quacy of private enforcement does not suggest a need for enhanced gov-
ernment action. Although antitrust injury sets limits on the private right
to sue for the practice, it does not foreclose suits in those circumstances in
which the practice is inefficient. 8°
72. The FTC in the Bush administration did obtain two consent decrees in resale price
maintenance cases. In re Kreepy Krauly, U.S.A., Inc., Dkt. No. C3354 (Dec. 20, 1991); In
re Nintendo of Am., Inc., Dkt. No. C3350 (Oct. 14, 1991).
73. The revocation was explained on the grounds "that the Guidelines unduly elevate
theory at the expense of factual analysis and reflect a continued resistance to case law that,
at this point in our history, is inappropriate." Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bin-
gaman's Address to ABA Antitrust Section [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.(BNA) No. 1627, at 251 (Aug. 12, 1993).
74. United States v. Canstar Sports USA, Inc., No. 2-93CV77 (D. Vt. filed Mar. 17,
1993). The FTC has been slightly more active in this area during the Clinton administra-
tion. See Keds Corp., C-3490 (Apr. 1, 1994); Reebok Int'l Ltd., FTC File No. 921 0117(May 4, 1995) (proposed consent order accepted and published for comment).
75. 60 Minutes with the Honorable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 59 ANTrrRusT L.J. 3, 20 (1990).
76. Posner, supra note 1, at 501.
77. See, e.g., William S. Comanor, Vertical Price Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions,
and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985).
78. For recent surveys, see Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Contro-
versy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTIRUST L.J. 59 (1994); Roger D. Blair &
James M. Fesmire, The Resale Price Maintenance Policy Dilemma, 60 S. ECON. J. 1043(1994).
79. Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litiga-
tion, 34 J.L. & ECON. 263, 292 (1991).
80. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Isaksen v. Ver-
mont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988)




Posner argued in A Program that some form of prohibition on horizon-
tal mergers was necessary to prevent firms from evading the prohibition
on price fixing by simply combining into a single entity.8' In his book on
antitrust law, published five years later, he argued that such a goal would
be the only reason for an antimerger policy, if antitrust law had devel-
oped an effective policy against collusion.82 Given that it has not, how-
ever, he suggested that a merger policy could be justified to reduce the
likelihood of collusion. Even then, however,
[s]ince concentration is only one of the factors that predispose a mar-
ket to collusion, one cannot specify a 'dangerous' level of concentra-
tion without knowing a good deal about a particular market; and
even then, the theory of collusion is not so well developed that one
can say at precisely what point a rising level of concentration will
increase the danger of collusive price of a sort difficult to punish di-
rectly under the Sherman Act.83
He sharply criticized the existing merger doctrine as being preoccupied
with levels of concentration that posed no risk of collusion. Nevertheless,
he proposed that mergers that either raise four-firm concentration over
sixty percent or substantially increase concentration in markets predis-
posed to collusion should be presumed illegal.8 He criticized the law's
concern with a trend toward concentration,8 5 but also rejected an effi-
ciency defense on grounds of practicality. 86 On the issue of market defi-
nition, he emphasized the role of elasticities of demand and supply facing
the merging firms as the crucial indicia of market power. He rejected the
law's concept of submarkets; argued in favor of considering supply-side
substitution; and advocated the use of the Herfindahl-Hirshman index
(HHI) of market concentration. 87
Posner's approach has had remarkable success in the Justice Depart-
ment, particularly in the successive revisions of the Merger Guidelines.88
Although the Guidelines go beyond Posner's recommendations, it is no
exaggeration to say that he could have written major parts of them. First,
the Guidelines follow Posner in articulating an economic approach to de-
maintenance; but neither is being prevented from taking a free ride on another dealer's
efforts a form of antitrust injury compensable by a damage award.").
81. Posner, supra note 1, at 525.
82. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 96 (1976).
83. Id. at 96-97.
84. Id. at 112.
85. Id. at 101.
86. Id. at 112-13.
87. POSNER, supra note 82, at 55-56; Posner, supra note 18, at 1602-03.
88. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines (Apr. 2, 1992) [hereinafter cited as 1992 Guidelines], reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,104; Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, (June 14, 1984), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,103 [hereinafter cited as 1984 Guidelines]; Department of
Justice, Merger Guidelines, (June 14, 1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)




fining markets. The original 1968 Guidelines did not address this issue.
Second, the Guidelines adopt Posner's criteria for evaluating the compet-
itive effects of mergers. Under the Guidelines, a merger is anticompeti-
tive if it increases the likelihood that the merged firm will restrict output
either unilaterally or by collusion with other firms.89 This standard
clearly reflects an adoption of the tacit collusion theory of oligopoly and a
rejection of the interdependence theory.
But the similarity to Posner's approach extends to the details. Not only
do the Guidelines adopt the HHI as their measure of concentration, they
largely adopt Posner's recommended thresholds for scrutiny of mergers.
For example, they create a safe harbor for mergers in markets with HHI
below 1000, as Posner suggested. 9° Moreover, their threshold for stricter
scrutiny of mergers is virtually the same as the one proposed by Posner.
Posner recommended challenging mergers that increased HHI by more
than 40 in markets with an HHI of 2000; the 1992 Guidelines state that
mergers that increase HHI by more than 50 in a market with HHI above
1800 "potentially raise significant competitive concerns." 91 The list of
factors that the Guidelines proposes for identifying markets in which col-
lusion is likely-stable market shares, standardized pricing, a history of
collusion in the market, and so on-bears a strong resemblance to the list
proposed by Posner. No where in the Guidelines do we find "sub-
markets" or a "trend toward concentration," concepts Posner criticized. 92
The Guidelines do, however, recognize an efficiencies defense,93 which
Posner would not have permitted.
Merger enforcement has generally followed the path recommended by
Posner and endorsed by the Guidelines. Although the Supreme Court's
populist decisions of the 1960s remain nominally good law, the lower
courts have recognized that the economic reorientation of antitrust law in
the Supreme Court also affected merger standards. Throughout the Rea-
gan years, the Division's merger enforcement litigation efforts fell signifi-
cantly, by any measure. 94 During the Bush years, the Division brought
more cases, although they were decidedly unsuccessful in those that
reached the litigation stage. 95 With the advent of the Clinton administra-
89. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 88, § 2.0.
90. Posner, supra note 18, at 1603; see Stephen Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 71 CAL. L. REV. 402, 429 (1983).
91. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 88, § 1.51(c). The quoted language liberalizes the ear-
lier Guidelines' statement that the Division would likely challenge such mergers. 1984
Guidelines § 3.11(c), supra note 88.
92. Indeed, the Guidelines adopt the smallest market principle, thereby repudiating
the concept of a relevant submarket. 1992 Guidelines, supra note 88, § 1.0.
93. Id. § 4. See generally Joseph Kattan, Comment, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis,
62 ANTnTRUST L.J. 513 (1994).
94. See Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a
Global Economy, 81 GEo. L.J. 195, 196 n.4 (1992) (merger enforcement dropped by half in
Reagan years); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Merger Policy and
the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTrTRusT BULL. 211, 213 (1988).
95. The Division lost 5 of 6 cases that went to trial in the three years of Assistant
Attorney General James F. Rill's tenure; they did achieve successful settlements of 31
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tion and the revision of the Merger Guidelines in 1992, merger enforce-
ment has increased. 96 In the new Administration, a substantial share of
the Division's resources will be devoted to mergers, not all of them hori-
zontal.97 Nevertheless, the basic focus of the Division's merger enforce-
ment efforts on horizontal mergers of firms with high market share
remains unchanged.
Enforcement under the revised Guidelines generally represents a sensi-
ble response to the ambiguities of the law and economics of mergers.
Given the difficulty of challenging tacit collusion directly, it is appropriate
to use the criteria of predisposing characteristics to identify mergers that
may significantly increase the likelihood of tacit collusion. Moreover, the
courts' antitrust injury decisions make it unlikely that private enforce-
ment of section 7 will be sufficient. 98 There have been calls in recent
years for still more aggressive merger enforcement, placing greater im-
portance on somewhat lower market shares.99 It cannot be said, how-
ever, that such an effort would be supported by economic consensus. The
link between concentration and tacit collusion is no more clearly estab-
lished now than it was when Posner wrote A Program.100
The path of enhanced enforcement faces a more substantial obstacle
than the lack of a consensus: the federal courts. 10 Although most pro-
posed mergers the Division chooses to challenge are dropped by the par-
ties, the Division has had difficulty in winning the merger cases that have
come to trial.' 02 In one case, a panel that included two future members
of the Supreme Court rejected the Division's case against a merger of
other cases. Rill Discusses Accomplishments, Disappointments of Division Tenure, 63 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 253 (Aug. 27, 1992).
96. In the first half of fiscal year 1994, the Division challenged 14 mergers, and ob-
tained settlements in 13. Most recently, it obtained a settlement of its challenge of
Microsoft's acquisition of Intuit, Inc. Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft Scraps a Software
Deal that U.S. Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at Al.
97. Bingaman, supra note 15, at 327 (Division will enforce 1992 Guidelines, but "our
analysis does not stop there since nonhorizontal mergers may have potential anticompeti-
tive effects.").
98. In general, competitors will not be permitted to challenge a merger, unless it poses
a significant risk of predatory pricing. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S.
104 (1986). Consumers may lack the incentive to sue for injunctive relief and would face
significant obstacles to proof of damages.
99. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 94, at 200 ("Horizontal mergers ought to be pre-
sumptively unlawful where there is a combined market share of fifteen or sixteen
percent.").
100. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 11.3, at 301
(1985) (sensing "vague consensus" that 4-firm concentration over 75% promotes collu-
sion). Posner, supra note 1, at n.2 (no consensus on level of concentration that facilitates
collusion).
101. See Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust:
Striking the Right Balance, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 45 (1989) (courts "appear to be converging
on a definition of safe harbor firms possessing less than a 20-25% market share in a rele-
vant market.").
102. See generally Stephen Calkins, Developments in Merger Litigation: The Govern-
ment Doesn't Always Win, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 855 (1988).
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firms with a combined market share exceeding sixty percent.' 0 3 The 1992
revisions of the Guidelines seek to avoid what some perceive as the
courts' too ready acceptance of ease-of-entry and power-buyer defenses
in merger cases.'04 Beyond such issues, the likelihood that the present
judiciary will accept more innovative theories of liability is remote.
IV. SINGLE-FIRM EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
Posner defined the category of single-firm abuses by defining their ef-
fects and by distinguishing them from cartels:
An abuse, as used here, is a practice by which a single firm, without
entering into any express or implied agreement with competitors,
seeks to increase its power over price and output. The firm may en-
list the aid of noncompeting firms, such as suppliers or customers, as
in exclusive-dealing and tying arrangements, but there must be no
combination of competitors.' 0 5
Posner found that "many economists, including some very distinguished
ones, doubt that abuses can, except in very unusual circumstances," re-
strict output.'0 6 Clearly, Posner agreed with those economists. He ar-
gued that, at one time, monopolies could be created by merger, but that
the Sherman Act, at least as interpreted by the Supreme Court after 1920,
and section 7 of the Clayton Act cut off the merger route to monopoly. 0 7
A contemporary monopoly, then, could be the result either of internal
growth or of mergers long ago.
According to Posner, only three explanations exist for any persistent
monopoly unaided by recent merger: abuses, efficiency, and governmen-
tally imposed entry barriers.'08 Posner believed that because abuses
rarely can generate monopoly power, an enduring monopoly had to be
the result of efficiency or governmental restrictions. Posner encouraged
the Division to do what it could to lessen the anticompetitive effects of
governmental restrictions, including those incident to the patent laws, but
he recognized that the Division's legal power was limited. 10 9
"[G]overnmental protection against new entry is not involved," there-
fore, "the persistence of a monopoly for a long period of time is... prima
facie the result of efficiency."' 10 Posner reasoned that unless "economies
103. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(Thomas, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.).
104. On the guidelines, see generally, Symposium on the New 1992 Merger Guidelines,
38 ANTITRUST BULL. 473 (1993). See also Mary Lou Steptoe, The Power-Buyer Defense in
Merger Cases, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 493 (1993).
105. Posner, supra note 1, at 507-08.
106. Id. at 508 (footnotes omitted). The qualification-"except in very unusual circum-
stances"-though often ignored in discussing Chicago theory, is important, as we discuss
later.
107. Id. at 527. In 1920, the Court suggested in United States v. United States Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920), that a merger creating monopoly power would run afoul of the
Sherman Act. Posner, supra note 1, at 527 n.88.
108. Id. at 528.
109. Id. at 528, 529-31.
110. Id. at 528.
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of scale dictate monopoly or the monopolist consistently and substantially
outperforms all rivals," situations in which the monopoly is efficient, a
monopoly price will attract new entry and the consequent contraction of
market share."' The monopoly, therefore, will not persist.
The logic, he conceded, "assumes that the costs of a new entrant will
not be markedly higher than the costs of the monopolist."'1 2 But he
found that, given his hypothesis that government entry barriers are ab-
sent, the assumption is appropriate. It is a description of an entry barrier
in the Stiglerian sense-"a condition that imposes on a new entrant
higher long-term costs of operating in the market than are borne by firms
already there""13-and he suggested that it is usually caused by govern-
ment action.
Posner noted that an entry barrier in the broader, Bainian sense-"any
condition that would delay the immediate entry by new competitors into
a market in which firms were charging a price above cost""14 -may be
"an important factor in whether a serious limitation of output is possi-
ble.""115 The monopoly protected by such entry barriers would gradually
erode, but one could argue that "the antitrust agencies should intervene
to produce more quickly the result that would eventually flow from the
natural workings of market forces. 11 6 Posner rejected the claim. The
wisdom of the approach depends on "the relative speed of market and
legal processes in reducing high concentration to a tolerable level; and
empirical study suggests that legal processes do not work significantly
faster. They are probably more costly too."117 Posner remarked that the
"use of cumbersome and expensive structural remedies against recently
formed monopolies likely to fall of their weight seems especially dubi-
ous.' '1 8 Finally, attacking practices that erect Bainian entry barriers is
not justified by an economic consensus standard because economists disa-
gree on the effect and importance of various supposed entry-retarding
conditions, such as the use of advertising and the need to accumulate
capital.119
111. Id
112. Posner, supra note 1, at 528.
113. Id at 510 (citing GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-70
(1968)).
114. Posner, supra note 1, at 510 (citing JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION
ch. IV (1956)).
115. Id. at 510.
116. Id. at 528.
117. Id at 528-29, 510-11 (footnotes omitted).
118. Id. at 529.
119. Posner, supra note 1, at 510-11. Posner discounted the significance of entry barri-
ers in a third sense (attributed to Donald Turner) of "nonrecurring costs of entry," which
favor the incumbent. Id. at 511-12. Posner found the argument "highly speculative." The
most plausible example of a nonrecurring cost of entry is the premium a new entrant must
pay to borrow money for a risky venture. But a new entrant would be able profitably to
incur any such premium because the incumbent will be charging a monopoly price. A price
above cost but below the monopoly level that can forestall entry indefinitely is only possi-
ble when the new entrant has permanently higher costs, a condition that Turner assumed
away. Id. at 512-13.
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Since Posner wrote his recommendations, the Division has dramatically
reduced its prosecution of monopolization cases. The IBM case, which
Posner specifically mentioned in A Program, eventually became "the An-
titrust Division's Vietnam. '120 The case continued for another decade
and consumed $17 million in resources before it was finally dropped in
abject failure. 121 The FTC's structural case (even more costly than the
IBM case) against the major petroleum refiners suffered an equally hu-
miliating conclusion in 1979.122 While the Division successfully obtained
a consent decree in 1982 in its case against AT&T, that result and the
simultaneous dismissal of IBM "seemed to draw the curtain on a century-
long cause. '123 The Division's recent case against Microsoft, limited as it
is to certain distributional restraints, does not alter this virtual abandon-
ment of the big case.124
We survey below some of the major developments in economic analysis
that could be used to argue for a renewed attack on exclusionary conduct.
Our conclusion is that under the criteria we have specified, the new argu-
ments fail to support a dramatic change in approach.
A. THE "ACCIDENTAL" MONOPOLY
The idea that enduring monopolies, unprotected by governmental en-
try barriers, are presumptively the result of efficiency has been a central
tenet of Chicago dogma. 125 Soon after Posner published A Program, Oli-
ver Williamson countered that a monopoly may result from "historic acci-
dent": "[T]he dominant firm may be thrust ahead of its competitors by an
unusual sequence of fortuitous events."'1 26 Then Professor Stephen
Breyer agreed, suggesting that a monopolist might "have profited from
simple, blind, dumb luck."'1 27 Such a firm would be one kind of "honest
monopolist," a monopolist "whose power rests neither upon legal licenses
or natural efficiencies, on the one hand, nor upon predatory or exclusion-
ary practices, on the other.' 128
120. Donald 1. Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 898, 899 n.13 (1986) (quoting Robert Bork).
121. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Fu-
ture of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IowA L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.20
(1989).
122. Id.
123. d at 1109.
124. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network
Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decisionmaking, 40
ANTIRlusT BuLL. (forthcoming Summer 1995).
125. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 171,195 (rev. ed. 1993) (no
entry barriers exist "that do not reflect superior efficiency and can be erected by firms to
inhibit rivals"); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 928 (1979) ("firms cannot in general obtain or enhance monopoly power by
unilateral action").
126. Oliver E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Fail-
ure Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1518 (1972).
127. Stephen G. Breyer, The Problem of the Honest Monopolist, 44 ANTrrRusT L.J.
194, 195 (1975).
128. Id. at 194.
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Williamson also argued that the supply of business acumen may not be
elastic. 129 If the monopolist's management talent is indivisible and supe-
rior to its actual and potential rivals, the monopolist should be immune
from legal attack. 130 But Williamson believed that special management
talent may often produce a significant "organizational innovation" early
in a firm's development and that the "firm may then remain dominant
despite the lack of any continuing superior acuity.' 31 Moreover, man-
agement may be "superior" only in the sense that rivals are "uncom-
monly inept."'1 32 Williamson argued that monopolies resulting from
historic accident and those resulting from prior business acumen or the
ineptitude of rivals typically should be attacked. He believed that such a
monopolist's market position will often be secure and unlikely to be un-
done expeditiously by the market and that efficacious remedies are possi-
ble. Though he recognized that the speed of legal remedies is a relative
concept that depends upon the speed of market forces, he intimated that
Posner exaggerated the corrective effect of the market and the likely
length of enforcement proceedings. 33
Although Breyer agreed that the honest monopolist whose power
"rests upon luck or the inferior skills of competitors" offers little value to
the economy, he did not believe that "courts ... could ever make the
distinction" suggested by Williamson between such a monopolist and one
whose power rests upon superior abilities or products. 134 Instead, he sug-
gested that government agencies alone be empowered to attack any per-
sistent, honest monopolist, that only structural remedies be available, and
that no action be allowed until the monopolist "has had a reasonable pe-
riod of time-ten years? fifteen?-to enjoy his well-gotten gains.' ' 35
Whatever the theoretical possibility of persistent, accidental monopo-
lies or enduring monopolies that owe their existence to ancient exercises
of business acumen or to the abiding incompetence of rivals, surely no
economic consensus would support Division efforts to eradicate them.
Indeed, measuring the competence of a firm against some imagined, ab-
solute standard is a meaningless exercise. Nor are the federal courts, as
presently constituted, likely to accept such a theory. Accidental monopo-
lies, even if they exist, would be virtually impossible to identify in litiga-
tion and the risk of costly error is high.
B. RAISING RIVALS' COSTS
A more serious challenge to Posner's presumption relates to the cate-
gory of monopolies that are maintained by abusive conduct, or exclusion-
129. Williamson, supra note 126, at 1516.
130. d at 1517-18.
131. Id. at 1517.
132. Id
133. Id. at 1514 n.11.
134. Breyer, supra note 127, at 197.
135. Id at 200.
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ary practices in an economically meaningful sense.' 36 This is the category
that Chicago analysts acknowledged as a logical possibility but deemed
insignificant in practice. During the 1980s, some economists suggested
anticompetitive explanations for a host of practices that Chicago theorists
had found efficient. 137 Much of this analysis has been expounded under
the label "raising rivals' costs.' 138 The fundamental idea behind the anal-
ysis is that a firm can transact with input suppliers in such a way that the
input costs of actual or possible competitors is increased. 139 This can be
accomplished either by directly foreclosing supply from rivals or by in-
ducing collusion among the rivals' suppliers. The centerpiece of the
methodology is the concept of "exclusionary rights.' 140 According to the
analysis, a firm can obtain anticompetitive exclusionary rights either by
purchasing naked commitments from suppliers not to sell to the firm's
competitors141 or by procuring control over unneeded quantities of the
136. Bork has complained that courts had used the term "exclusionary" in a tautologi-
cal sense, to refer to any practices that result in the monopolist's dominance: "[W]hatever
a firm does that gives it a market share excludes rivals from that share of the market."
BORK, supra note 125, at 172. He suggested that exclusionary practices, in a sense relevant
to antitrust, are "barriers that do not reflect superior efficiency and can be erected by firms
to inhibit rivals." Id. at 195. Similarly, Breyer lamented the trend in the courts to expand
the notion of exclusionary conduct, such that the concept was weakened and might be
distorted to "produce seriously anticompetitive effects in a host of industries." Breyer,
supra note 127, at 197, 199. He defined exclusionary conduct as "acts that impair the com-
petitive opportunities of rivals without, at the same time, furthering those forms of compe-
tition that the antitrust laws encourage." Id. at 194. Bork's view, and implicitly Breyer's,
was at least ostensibly endorsed by the Supreme Court in Aspen: Predatory, or exclusion-
ary, conduct is conduct that tends to "exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency."
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (citing ROB-
ERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 138 (1978)).
137. Examples include Phillipe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to En-
try, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987); Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, The "Foreclo-
sure" Effects of Vertical Mergers, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 207 (1991);
David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THE-
ORY 253 (1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deter-
rence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 280 (1982); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical
Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked Exclusion, 81
AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991).
138. This phrase is commonly attributed to Steven Salop, David Scheffman, and
Thomas Krattenmaker. The movement in the 1980s toward emphasizing the importance of
cost-raising strategies can be traced to a paper by Salop and Scheffman. Steven C. Salop &
David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983). The analysis
gained additional stature within the academic antitrust community with the publication of
an article by Salop and Krattenmaker. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, An-
ticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209 (1986) [hereinafter Anticompetitive Exclusion].
139. Id. A good, succinct summary of the analysis is Thomas G. Krattenmaker &
Steven C. Salop, Exclusion and Antitrust, 11 REGULATION 29 (1987). Another useful sum-
mary is Roger Ware, Understanding Raising Rivals' Costs: A Canadian Perspective, CANA-
DIAN COMPETITION RECORD 9 (Mar. 1994).
140. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 227.
141. Id. at 227, 235. Although a naked exclusionary rights agreement is a conceptual
possibility, none has been identified in an actual case. Krattenmaker and Salop cite United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), as the only case not
involving misuse of government process that mentions a naked exclusionary rights con-
tract. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 228. But Al-
coa involved no such thing. See John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek, Another Look at
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input and then denying those units to rivals, a tactic that may involve
overbuying or a vertical merger. 142
One kind of direct foreclosure is said to occur when a firm obtains
exclusionary rights from all of the lowest-cost suppliers of an input, so
that the firm's rivals are forced to resort to high-cost suppliers. 143 Ac-
cording to Krattenmaker and Salop, "antitrust literati know this as the
'bottleneck' or 'essential facilities' "strategy. 144 Alternatively, a predator
engages in the "Real Foreclosure" prong of direct foreclosure when it
"acquires an exclusionary right over a representative portion of the sup-
ply, withholding that portion from the rivals and thereby driving up the
market price for the remainder of the input still available to rivals.' ' 145
Raising rivals' costs by inducing collusion also takes one of two forms:
"Cartel Ringmaster," in which the purchaser of the exclusionary right
orchestrates cartel-like discriminatory input pricing by suppliers against
its rivals;146 or "Frankenstein Monster," in which the vertical restraint al-
ters the input industry's structure, increasing the probability that the re-
maining unrestrained suppliers will successfully collude to raise the price
charged to the predator's competitors. 147
A strategy of raising rivals' costs generally injures consumers only if it
results in higher prices in the output market.148 Thus, the affected input
must be a significant part of the production mix and its price must in-
crease significantly. 149 The dominant firm may exclude rivals from the
market altogether by increasing the price of the input enough so that
their production would be unprofitable; 50 instead, rivals might continue
to produce but with higher costs, so that the market price of the output,
which is determined by the marginal producers, is higher than it would
otherwise be.15 ' In addition, the restraint must affect all existing and po-
tential rivals. 152 Further, the strategy will only be rational if it is profita-
Alcoa: Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View, 35 J.L. & ECON. 311, 318-19(1992).
142. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 228, 236-37.
Overbuying involves purchasing more of an input from an independent supplier than the
firm uses in production. Vertical integration involves the purchase of a supplier followed,
perhaps, by a reduction in the amount of the input produced. One might also logically
identify an "ancillary exclusionary right" in which the purchaser buys some units of an
input from independent suppliers and a promise not to sell other units to the purchaser's
competitors.
143. Id. at 234.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 236.
146. Id. at 238.
147. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 240.
148. The "Cartel Ringmaster" variant of raising-rivals'-costs does not depend upon
profits in the output market. Rather, it is essentially a horizontal model, in which input
suppliers earn monopoly profits in the input market and share them with the vertically-
related "ringmaster" for managing the cartel. See id at 240.
149. Id. at 243.
150. Id. at 246; Ware, supra note 139, at 9.
151. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 251; Ware,
supra note 139, at 9.
152. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 243-47.
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ble, which requires that the predator's average costs increase less than its
rivals' marginal costs increase.' 53
Even skeptical economists have acknowledged that abuses can restrict
output "in very unusual circumstances.' 15 4 Indeed, Posner referred to
Aaron Director and Edward Levi's "classic formulation" of the Chicago
School's skeptical position.'55 That article recognized the possibility of
exclusionary conduct in terms strikingly similar to the language popular-
ized by raising-rivals'-costs analysts nearly thirty years later. Thus, Direc-
tor and Levi noted that a firm with monopoly power might profitably
"decide to impose additional costs upon itself for the sake of a restric-
tion" on suppliers or customers "if the effect of it would be to impose
greater costs on possible competitors.' 5 6 The major contribution of
Salop, Scheffinan, Krattenmaker, and other scholars who have pursued
their line of reasoning has been to formalize the insight of Director and
Levi and to investigate its implications.' 57 In doing so, they have argued
that what Director and Levi believed to be a "special case"'158 of limited
significance is really a broad and expansive category encompassing all of
the common vertical restraints.' 59
As raising-rivals'-costs methodology was refined and extended, a bar-
rage of criticism was leveled against it. Some critics complain that, in
application, the methodology produces no net gain in antitrust problem
solving relative to traditional analysis. 6° Others contend that proponents
153. Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Exclusion, Collusion, or Confusion?: The
Underpinnings of Raising Rivals' Costs, 16 RES. L. & ECON. 73, 76 (1994). See generally
Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 273 (discussing the
profitability of a raising-rivals'-costs strategy).
154. Posner, supra note 1, at 508.
155. Id. at 508 n.17, citing Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:
Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281 (1956).
156. Director & Levi, supra note 155, at 290.
157. See Coate & Kleit, supra note 153, at 74 (tracing the development of the idea from
Director and Levi through Salop and Scheffman and subsequent authors extending the
theory to special case applications). As an example of an implication that later authors
discovered, Director and Levi seem to assume that the predator must possess at least some
monopoly power in order to pursue a profitable cost-raising strategy. Director & Levi,
supra note 155, at 290. Modern advocates of the methodology point out that, so long as
there are barriers to entry and expansion in the output market, "a firm need not enjoy or
acquire traditional market power to gain the ability to price above pre-exclusionary-rights
competitive levels." Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at
251. In theory, of course, the strategy is more likely to be profitable the greater the market
share of the predator, for profitability depends in part on the increase in average costs
incurred by the predator, and average cost will increase less the larger the output. See
generally id. at 271. 275.
158. Director & Levi, supra note 155, at 290.
159. Krattenmaker and Salop claim that "virtually all antitrust issues not involving col-
laboration (or merger) among competitors are best analyzed by asking whether they unjus-
tifiably confer on one party the power to raise price by raising rivals' costs." Krattenmaker
& Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 231. They make clear that an appli-
cation of their analysis to "exclusive dealing arrangements, tying contracts, boycotts, refus-
als to deal, and vertical mergers" can result in a finding that the practice is anticompetitive.
Id. at 215.
160. See, e.g., Timothy J. Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs," 33 AzN~-
TRUST BULL. 95, 96 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking
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of the analysis understate the predator's costs of exclusion and hence ex-
aggerate the likely profitability of the strategy.' 6 ' Still others maintain
that the proponents do not adequately take account of counterstrategies
that rivals are likely to use to defeat the predator's attempt to gain an
advantage. 162 Some argue that proponents ignore the potential strategic
use of the methodology by firms as a basis for antitrust charges against
their more efficient competitors. 163 Moreover, the analysis propounded
does not endogenously take efficiencies into account, and its proponents
have offered no workable test to distinguish the vertical practice that is
on balance efficient from that which is not.164 More generally, applica-
tion of the paradigm in practice, as outlined by its advocates, requires
quantitative assessments of competitive effects that are beyond the nor-
mal capabilities of courts and enforcement agencies.165
Another line of criticism has taken the form of detailed studies of anti-
trust cases. Proponents of raising-rivals'-costs purport to explain most of
the prominent exclusion cases in the annals of antitrust in terms of the
strategy. But the proffered anticompetitive explanations for the princi-
pal ones have been challenged. For example, United States v. Terminal
Railroad Ass'n' 66 involved a group of railroads' acquisition of exclusive
access to bridges over the Mississippi River at St. Louis. Raising-rivals'-
costs disciples claim that the action was taken to allow the railroads to
charge their competitors a higher price for access than they themselves
incurred; 167 critics counter that the railroads simply acquired a vertically-
related monopoly and, as standard economic analysis would predict,
charged rivals the same price they charged themselves. 168 Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.169 involved alleged agreements between a de-
partment store and several appliance manufacturers not to sell or to sell
only at discriminatorily high prices to a nearby retailer. Proponents ar-
gue that the store was attempting to harm its rival either by directly fore-
closing supply or by orchestrating a supplier's cartel;170 critics respond
Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 314-16 (1987); Wesley J. Liebeler, Exclusion and Efficiency, 11
REGULATION 34, 34, 36-37 (1987).
161. See, e.g., Coate & Kleit, supra note 153, at 82.
162. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux, Turning Back the Antitrust Clock: Nonprice Preda-
tion in Theory and Practice, 13 REGULATION 45, 49 (1990).
163. See, e.g., Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws:
The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551 (1991); Antitrust in New Zealand: The Case
for Reform 36 (New Zealand Business Roundtable, Sept. 1988).
164. See Liebeler, supra note 160, at 37.
165. See Stephen Calkins, Comments on Presentation of Steven C. Salop, 56 ANTITRUST
L.J. 65, 68 (1987). For a sense of the quantitative complexity of the proposed application
of the methodology, see Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138,
at 264-65, 281.
166. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
167. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 234.
168. David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an
Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J.L. & EcON. 419, 437 (1990).
169. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).




that the arrangements were more likely used to prevent the rival from
free riding on the store's promotional investments. 171 In United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America 72 Alcoa procured sufficient electric power
and bauxite to produce virtually all of the aluminum in the United States.
Proponents contend that Alcoa excluded rivals by directly foreclosing
them from the supply of the two necessary inputs and perhaps by induc-
ing collusion among suppliers;173 critics reply that Alcoa used all of the
inputs it purchased and in any event did not control enough of the sup-
plies to make foreclosure plausible.174 In United States v. United Shoe
Machine Corp.175 the defendant supplied shoe machinery only under
long-term leases. Proponents charge that the leasing policy was designed
to deter entry into the industry; 76 critics respond that leasing assured
quality and fostered the provision of services and information. 77 In Lo-
rain Journal Co. v. United States178 a newspaper refused to allow advertis-
ers to advertise concurrently over the local radio station. Proponents call
it a "classic case of monopolization by exclusion of competitors"'179 and
contend that "no one offers any efficiency justification" for the newspa-
per's conduct; 80 critics now demonstrate that the newspaper may have
been attempting to induce merchants to use the efficient mix of different
kinds of advertising.181
As a foundation of a public enforcement policy, raising-rivals'-costs
suffers from another defect. There ought to be no shortage in supply of
private plaintiffs. Disadvantaged rivals would likely be the first to dis-
cover exclusionary tactics, and they would easily meet both antitrust
standing and injury requirements. Excluded potential competitors could
also sue, though they might have a difficult time proving that they would
have entered the market but for the cost-raising tactics of the incumbent.
The risk to sound antitrust policy from private suits based on raising-ri-
vals'-costs analysis is that they will encompass challenges to practices that
are really efficient, for the lure of treble damages is strong. Indeed, Ed-
ward Snyder and Thomas Kauper believe the risk is so great that they
would abolish competitors' suits and replace them with a form of parens
patriae action.182 This view underestimates judicial skepticism of innova-
tive economic theories and the willingness of courts to block, in part
171. Brennan, supra note 160, at 100 n.11; Coate & Kleit, supra note 153, at 87-88.
172. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
173. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 236-37, 241
n.106.
174. Lopatka & Godek, supra note 141, at 315-24.
175. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
176. See Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 218.
177. Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States versus United Shoe Machin-
ery Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33, 35 (1993).
178. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
179. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 218.
180. Rasmusen et al., supra note 137, at 1137.
181. John E. Lopatka & Andrew N. Kleit, The Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest
for Foreclosure in Antitrust, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1255 (1995).
182. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 163.
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through application of the antitrust injury doctrine, spurious private com-
petitor claims. 183 In any event, though, the chance that a victim will stoi-
cally endure a truly anticompetitive practice that can be couched in
raising-rivals'-costs terminology is remote.
Advocates of raising-rivals'-costs methodology have not been oblivious
to the criticisms of the analysis, and they have attempted to respond to
some of them.184 They have not replied to all, however, and their re-
sponses have not been wholly persuasive. A survey of the intellectual
landscape discloses no consensus that raising-rivals'-costs methodology
should be used by the Division to launch a wide-ranging campaign against
exclusionary practices. Malcolm Coate and Andrew Kleit, for example,
conclude tersely, "[I]t may well be welfare enhancing simply not to use
raising rivals' costs as a general antitrust enforcement strategy."'1 85 Even
a sympathetic critic, Roger Ware, observes, "[i]t is fair to say in summary
that more study is needed on the overall efficiency effects of [raising-ri-
vals'-costs] practices before a clear enforcement consensus emerges.' 86
The academic controversy was not lost on former Division chief Charles
Rule. He dismissed the analysis, commenting:
In fact, this school of thought should be known as 'raising clients'
costs.' It often describes nothing but discredited theories of vertical
foreclosure that misdirect attention from the relevant horizontal ef-
fect of a practice .... [R]aising rivals' costs has nothing to add to
existing antitrust doctrine. Certainly, the questionable theories can-
not support heightened intervention in private market transactions
to combat perceived predatory conduct. 187
At most, a consensus of economic thinking could support an enforcement
policy that attacked the special case, if it could be identified without the
use of exorbitant resources, in which a private action is unlikely, the
structural characteristics of the markets are conducive to successful pre-
dation, the conduct of the dominant firm has an obvious potential to in-
jure rivals seriously, and no efficiency justifications are plausible.
Even if there were more scholarly support for the raising rivals'-costs-
analysis, there would remain an insurmountable obstacle to basing an en-
forcement program on it: The federal courts have virtually ignored the
theory for a decade while it has been hotly debated in the scholarly litera-
ture. The term "raising-rivals'-costs" appears in 186 separate publications
in the Westlaw "Journals and Law Reviews" database, but it appears in
183. See William H. Page & Roger D. Blair, Controlling the Competitor Plaintiff in An-
titrust Litigation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 111, 121-23 (1992).
184. See, e.g., Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138, at 266-
82.
185. Coate & Kleit, supra note 153, at 89.
186. Ware, supra note 139, at 13. Ware describes himself as "a contributor to the litera-
ture on strategic behaviour." Id. at 9.
187. Charles F. Rule, Claims of Predation in a Competitive Marketplace: When Is an
Antitrust Response Appropriate?, Remarks by the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice, Before the 1988 Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Ass'n (Aug. 9, 1988).
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only four cases in the Westlaw "Allfeds" database, and in none of these
four was it the basis for liability.188 The four references include, of
course, judicial citations to the most prominent article advocating the
concept, 189 an article cited scores of times in the law review literature.
Admittedly, courts normally resist new theories. Indeed, the federal
courts were impervious to the Chicago theories for years after they were
initially published. But the present judicial outlook counsels against a
major change in enforcement policy.
C. NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
Another possible source of novel theories of exclusion is the bur-
geoning literature on network externalities, or the economics of sys-
tems.' 9° This literature has gained prominence in the recent litigation
surrounding the Division's consent decree in its monopolization suit
against Microsoft Corporation.19' All sides in that litigation agree that
the relevant market is a classic illustration of network externalities and
that this characteristic of the market has important antitrust
implications.192
A network arises when "the utility that a user derives from consump-
tion of [a] good increases with the number of other agents consuming the
good."'1 93 The value of membership in a telecommunications network,
for example, "is positively affected when another user joins and enlarges
the network.' 94 Such a network exhibits "direct" network externalities.
"Indirect" network externalities arise "where complementary goods be-
come more plentiful and lower in price as the number of users of the
188. See National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992); Pre-
mier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir.
1987); Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986);
Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Tele-Communications, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 6658 (LAP), 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14522 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
189. Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion, supra note 138.
190. Contributions to the literature include STANLEY M. BESEN & LELAND L. JOHN-
SON, COMPATIBILITY STANDARDS, COMPETITION, AND INNOVATION IN THE BROADCAST-
ING INDUSTRY (1986); Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON.
REV. 332 (May 1985); Nicholas Economides, Desirability of Compatibility in the Absence of
Network Externalities, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1165 (Dec. 1988); Nicholas Economides &
Steven Salop, Competition and Integration Among Complements, and Network Market
Structure, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 105 (1992); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base
and Compatibility: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 940 (Dec. 1986) [hereinafter Installed Base]; Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Stand-
ardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
424 (June 1985) [hereinafter Network Externalities]; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Prod-
uct Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 55 (1992); Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL.
ECON. 822 (1986).
191. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 1995-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 1 71,027 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
192. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 124.
193. Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 190.
194. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994) [hereinafter Systems Competition].
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good increases."' 195 Thus, economies of scale exist in the production of
the complementary goods. 196 In the "hardware/software" paradigm, for
example, the prices of computer programs decline and the varieties in-
crease as computer users proliferate. Of course, as software becomes
cheaper or more plentiful, the demand for the hardware increases. The
two are used together to perform some function, and as the effective price
of one component drops, the price of the system drops.
Markets exhibiting network externalities can fail, in that the unregu-
lated outcome produces less total surplus than is possible. Indeed, recog-
nizing that "externality" is commonly understood to denote market
failure. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis define network effect as the
"circumstance in which the net value of an action ... is affected by the
number of agents taking equivalent actions;" they limit network external-
ity to the "specific kind of network effect in which the equilibrium exhib-
its unexploited gains from trade regarding network participation," a
definition that implies market failure.' 97 Their definitions have the ad-
vantage of emphasizing that markets involving complementary goods are
ubiquitous in the economy, yet no one would argue that all these markets
fail.
The market failure associated with true network externalities is related
to the idea of user expectations. The decision to join a network, and im-
plicitly the amount a user is willing to pay to join a network, is affected by
his expectations about the eventual size of the network.' 98 For example,
a person is likely to pay more for a telephone the greater the number of
other telephone users with whom he expects to be able to communicate;
he may pay more for a computer the cheaper and more plentiful he ex-
pects software to be. Because expectations pertain to future events, and
information about the future is imperfect, they almost always imply risk.
Expectations play the most obvious role in markets where networks
compete. A consumer who is choosing between an Apple computer and
an IBM-compatible computer, for example, may base her decision in part
on her expectations about the future price and availability of software
written for each. This may induce her to select the network she expects
to be larger. She may also prefer the system that she anticipates will be
more popular so that she can easily exchange files with the larger pool of
users. When incompatible networks compete, the market may fail in var-
ious ways. Users, who have invested in system-specific complementary
products and information, may stick with a network even when switching
195. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Trag-
edy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 (Spring 1994) [hereinafter Network Externality].
196. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 94.
197. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality, supra note 195, at 135.
Katz and Shapiro appear to recognize that not all network effects are properly character-
ized as network externalities, though they do not offer an explicit distinction between the
two concepts. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 95-100.
198. See id. at 93-94. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete:




to a new and improved technology would increase total economic surplus.
Such a market is said to exhibit "excess inertia."'199 On the other hand,
when a new system is offered, users may hop on the "bandwagon" and
adopt the new system in order to avoid being "stranded" in an obsolete
technology with a dwindling flow of complementary products. If surplus
would be maximized by retaining the old standard, the market is said to
exhibit "excess momentum" or "insufficient friction. '2 00 In theory, a
market may also fail when some but not all users switch to a new technol-
ogy: where social welfare would have been maximized had no users
switched, the market exhibits "inefficient adoption;" where social welfare
would have been maximized had all users switched, it exhibits "inade-
quate compatibility. "201
A feature commonly attributed to network markets is that they are
prone to "tipping," or "the tendency of one system to pull away from its
rivals in popularity once it has gained an initial edge. 202 The implication
is that each network sponsor has a strong incentive to take actions that
will give it that initial edge. Once a market is tipped, some models sug-
gest that the winning technology will persist, even if it is inferior and is
later challenged by better networks.20 3
Because it predicts that a single technology may defeat competing stan-
dards and come to dominate a market, network externalities theory is a
fertile ground for claims of monopolization.2 4 Critics, however, have
identified a number of problems with the theory that impair its utility as
an antitrust policy guide. For example, if a single network will survive
because of economies of scale,205 the market is a natural monopoly, a
199. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 108.
200. Id.; Farrell & Saloner, Installed Base, supra note 190, at 942.
201. Stanley M. Besen & Leland L. Johnson, Compatibility Standards, Competition, and
Innovation in the Broadcasting Industry, Rand Pub. No. R-3453-NSF 24-26 (1986). See
also Michael G. Vita & Charissa P. Wellford, Regulating the Electromagnetic Environment:
Alternative Approaches to Policy, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 235
(James R. Fleming & Henry A. Gemery eds., 1994).
202. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 106; see also Besen &
Farrell, Choosing How, supra note 198, at 118.
203. See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Externality, supra note 195, at 145 (noting
that a "clear implication of the network externalities literature is that often we cannot
move from one technology to a superior one").
204. Network sponsors need not compete to become the sole surviving technology.
They may, for example, choose instead to adopt a compatible standard. See generally
Besen & Farrell, Choosing How, supra note 198, at 124-29; Katz & Shapiro, Systems Com-
petition, supra note 194, at 109-112. An agreement among competitors to use a common
standard raises issues of collusion under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
205. This is not to say that economies of scale will always be so large that a single
network will inevitably result. Indeed, models that rest upon the assumption of inexhaust-
ible scale economies have been criticized on the ground that when the product is differenti-
ated-when different consumers value different attributes of networks-or when
consumer demands are fully satisfied with a network consisting of only a subset of all po-
tential users, more than one network may coexist. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margo-
lis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?, RES. LAW & ECON.
(forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter Market Failure]. See also Katz & Shapiro, Systems Compe-
tition, supra note 194, at 106 (noting that "[c]onsumer heterogeneity and product differenti-
ation tend to limit tipping and sustain multiple networks"). Our point is simply that when
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condition long recognized as a market failure. To present such a well-
understood condition in language of network externalities as something
new and unfamiliar risks confusion and policy mistakes.206 In such a case,
one network will inevitably prevail, and antitrust is ill-suited either to de-
termine which system should win or to regulate the victor. A monopoli-
zation case, brought after a network has achieved market dominance on
the ground that it is inferior to a vanquished system, would require an
intractable inquiry into the relative merits of the competing networks.
Network externalities theory thus cannot tell us whether a market out-
come is efficient or inefficient. 20 7
Network externalities theory also cannot identify specific "exclusion-
ary" conduct by which a firm acquired or maintained monopoly power-
a critical question in any monopolization case. According to some of the
models, markets can be tipped by trivial events.208 Many believe, for ex-
ample, that Microsoft's MS-DOS operating system achieved its present
dominance because IBM selected it long ago for the IBM PC.2°9 If his-
toric accident determines market outcomes, none of Microsoft's subse-
quent competitive acts contributed to its dominant position.
The importance of historic accident has rightly been questioned.210 Yet
even if inferior technologies do not regularly persist because of happen-
stance, many seemingly exclusionary practices that network sponsors
adopt may be legitimate. Network sponsors may adopt these practices
precisely to overcome the potential inefficiencies associated with net-
works. The literature suggests that firms engage in "penetration pricing"
to overcome network externalities-charging a low initial price that is
recouped over the life of the product by charges for related goods.211 The
firm engaging in the practice may earn no supra-competitive profits, for
the quasi-rents earned in later periods may offset losses incurred in early
periods.212 But such a firm may attract a charge of predatory pricing.
Other practices designed to internalize network externalities may simi-
a market can support only one network, one network will emerge, and the resulting prob-
lem for antitrust policy is the familiar one of natural monopoly.
206. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 205.
207. See generally Vita & Wellford, supra note 201, at 236-37.
208. W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by
Historical Events, 99 EcON. J. 116 (1989); David, supra note 190. To be more precise, this
assertion emerges from the literature of path dependency, in which the concept of network
externality plays a major role. See Liebowitz and Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 205;
S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 205 (1995) [hereinafter Path Dependence]. This idea that historic
accident can lead to an enduring monopoly recalls Williamson's notion of accidental mo-
nopoly. See supra, Part IV.A. The path dependency literature formalizes the idea.
209. See, e.g., Besen & Farrell, Choosing How, supra note 198, at 118.
210. See, e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, Path Dependence, supra note 208.
211. Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro explain that: By selling hardware below cost early
on, the network sponsor is stimulating the demand for software, which may lead to a lower
price of software if software is produced according to economies of scale or if the elasticity
of demand for software is higher for marginal consumers than for the average hardware
consumer. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 104. See also Besen &
Farrell, Choosing How, supra note 198, at 122.
212. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 107.
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larly be attacked as exclusionary. For example, to allay consumers' con-
cerns that a new network will not grow large enough to generate
adequate software, a hardware manufacturer may vertically integrate into
the production of software213 or enter into exclusive contracts with
software vendors.214
Some economists have condemned practices by which a network spon-
sor may attempt to tip a market in its favor and then rely upon excess
inertia to earn supra-competitive profits. Thus, a firm may engage in
"puffery"-claiming that its technology is superior to that of rivals and
exaggerating the popularity of its products to convince consumers that its
standard will ultimately prevail.215 Historically, puffery has not been the
stuff of antitrust law.216 Or, a firm might truthfully announce that a new
product will become available in order to discourage existing customers
from switching to another supplier or to encourage those intending to buy
soon to wait. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner claim that the prean-
nouncement "can sometimes secure the success of a new technology that
is socially not worth adopting, and that would not have been adopted
absent the preannouncement. ' 21 7 Such conduct could be anticompeti-
tive. Yet providing consumers with information they deem relevant obvi-
ously has the capacity to increase surplus, and no workable test has been
offered to identify inefficient product preannouncements. For that rea-
son, Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig conclude, "[A]ny timing of a
product preannouncement should be presumed legal. The diversity of
considerations that underlie the decision to predisclose the new product
make it impossible to fashion an implementable test for anticompetitive
product preannouncements. '21 8
What all of this suggests is that the models of network externalities
have not generated methods of identifying exclusionary conduct in prac-
tice. But beyond this, the very foundations of the literature have been
challenged. We have already alluded to some of these criticisms. The
literature confuses network externalities and network effects, thereby de-
tecting market failures in arrangements that are ubiquitous in the econ-
omy; it purports to take a familiar problem like natural monopoly and
present it as something new and different; and it often assumes that only
one network can survive, when in fact several can co-exist. Other criti-
cisms have been made. For example, what some proponents describe as
213. Id. at 101-103, 107.
214. Id. at 107.
215. See Besen & Farrell, Choosing How, supra note 198, at 122; Katz & Shapiro, Sys-
tems Competition, supra note 194, at 107.
216. It is more appropriately a matter for tort or consumer protection law. See
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTS 142-44 (2d ed. 1988).
217. Farrell & Saloner, Installed Base, supra note 190, at 942.
218. Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation:
Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 53 (1981). Ordover and Willig, however,
argue that product innovation in the context of "systems rivalry" can be predatory, that
predatory innovation can be identified in practice, and that it should be attacked. Id. at 9,
22-52. Needless to say, innovation typically benefits consumers and there is no consensus
that predatory innovation can be isolated in court.
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indirect network externalities are in fact pecuniary externalities, which
tend to ensure that the price system produces efficient outcomes.219
Perhaps the most telling criticism has been empirical. Exponents of
network externalities theory have pointed to several instances in which a
supposedly inferior technology was adopted and survived because of net-
work externalities. The standard typewriter keyboard, known as
QWERTY, 220 the VHS videotaping format,221 and monophonic AM
broadcasting 222 all triumphed over purportedly superior alternatives.
Critics have questioned all of these cases, showing that the prevailing
technologies were not meaningfully inferior and offering efficiency-en-
hancing explanations for the market results. 223 Surveying the claimed
empirical demonstrations of network externalities, Liebowitz and Margo-
lis conclude, "[w]e are aware of no compelling examples of markets fail-
ing in the sense that the 'wrong' choice of network, among feasible
alternatives, was made. '224 Of course, casual observation also tends to
cast doubt on the claim that network externalities routinely thwart move-
ment to better technologies, "from horses and buggies to automobiles,
from typewriters to computers, from mail to fax."'225 Liebowitz and Mar-
golis colorfully call the idea that superior technologies can seldom dis-
place existing ones the "Chicken Little view of market transitions. '226
They caution, "[T]he fact that current economic models of transition indi-
cate that worthwhile transitions may not occur is not sufficient reason to
abandon the presumption that they usually do occur. '227
Despite the conundrums of the literature, the Supreme Court gave
some impetus to use of the network externalities concept in antitrust
cases in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. 228 The
Court held that an equipment manufacturer, even though it had no mo-
nopoly power in that market, could be liable for both a tying violation
and monopolization by requiring consumers to purchase repair services
from it as a condition of obtaining distinctive replacement parts. 2 2 9 The
Court did not use the language of network externalities, but one could
easily describe the system of durable equipment, repair services, and
219. Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Externality, supra note 195, at 137.
220. David, supra note 190.
221. See W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 Sci. AM. 92 (1990).
222. See Besen & Johnson, supra note 201.
223. See, e.g., S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1990) (QWERTY keyboard comparable in functionality to Dvorak keyboard).
On VHS and Beta, see Liebowitz & Margolis, Path Dependence, supra note 208; S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Market Processes and the Selection of Standards 4-5 (work-
ing paper) (Mar. 18, 1992); B.C. Klopfenstein, The Diffusion of the VCR in the United
States, in THE VCR AGE 28 (Mark R. Levy ed., 1989). On AM stereo, see Vita &
Wellford, supra note 201, at 238.
224. Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Externality, supra note 195, at 146 (emphasis in
original).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 145.
227. Id. at 146.
228. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
229. Id. at 477-79.
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parts as an indirect network competing with alternative systems for mar-
ket dominance. 230 The Court stressed that consumers were locked-in to a
brand of equipment once they purchased a machine and that the costs of
determining the prices of aftermarket services and products at the time of
equipment purchase were high.231 Of course, the idea that consumers
cannot costlessly switch between networks and that they form crucial ex-
pectations about the future based on imperfect information are important
features of network externalities theory.
The United States, in its amicus brief, argued that an equipment manu-
facturer in a competitive market could probably not extract monopoly
profits in aftermarkets, 232 thereby suggesting a skepticism of the founda-
tions of network externalities theory. The Division under the Clinton ad-
ministration, however, has embraced network externalities theory in
filing a complaint against Microsoft for monopolizing the market in per-
sonal computer operating systems, although it limited the scope of its
complaint to restraints in the Microsoft's distribution contracts. 233 And it
resisted modification of consent decrees that prohibited Kodak, a camera
and film manufacturer, from making private label film and from selling
film with photo processing costs included. 234 One could describe a sys-
tem of camera and film and a system of film and processing as networks
exhibiting externalities.
The ultimate question for purposes of the present inquiry is whether a
consensus of economic thought supports the use of network externalities
theory as a basis of antitrust enforcement. Manifestly, no such consensus
exists. Katz and Shapiro, two of the most prominent contributors to the
literature, observe, "since market outcomes may be inefficient, it is theo-
retically possible for government intervention to improve market per-
formance. But there are several issues that must be addressed before
concluding that government intervention is warranted in practice. '235
They conclude, "[w]e are far from having a general theory of when gov-
ernment intervention is preferable to the unregulated market out-
230. Katz and Shapiro specifically refer to "durable equipment and repair services" as
an example of the hardware/software paradigm, or an indirect network. Katz & Shapiro,
Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 94. Shapiro and Teece provide an explicit network
analysis of Kodak, calling the case "the Court's most recent foray into the law and econom-
ics of systems...." Carl Shapiro & David J. Teece, Systems Competition and Aftermarkets:
An Economic Analysis of Kodak, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 135, 136 (1994) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See also Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 Ari-
TRUST L.J. 1 (1993).
231. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 472-74.
232. See id. at 470 n.16. In an amicus curiae brief, the government argued that any
increase in the price of parts or service would have to be reflected in a decrease in the price
of machines.
233. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 124. The D.C. Circuit recently reversed the dis-
trict court and ordered that the proposed consent decree be approved. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.C.C.), rev'd, 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,027 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
234. See United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 853 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
235. Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 194, at 112.
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come. '236 Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, in supporting a proposed
consent agreement in Microsoft, largely agreed with a description of net-
work externalities theory propounded by amici curiae, but disagreed with
their conclusion that the theory compelled intrusive measures to wrest
market share from Microsoft. Noting that the process by which a monop-
oly arises "is entirely natural in the market," he asked rhetorically, "[o]n
what basis can a government intervene to insure a better outcome?"
237
Michael Vita and Charissa Wellford observe that, although the network
externalities literature shows some possible inefficiencies, its importance
as a guide to governmental policy "remains undemonstrated.
238
In all, though the theory of network externalities is an intriguing object
of scholarly research and has captured the imagination of prominent
economists, it has not matured sufficiently to serve as the intellectual
foundation of a governmental enforcement program. In Microsoft anon-
ymous amici curiae, relying on the network externalities literature, have
criticized the Justice Department for not pursuing far broader relief, in-
cluding separation of Microsoft's operating systems and applications divi-
sions.239 It is certainly a defensible exercise of prosecutorial discretion to
decline to do so. Again, there is no doctrinal obstacle preventing the
amici (presumably Microsoft's competitors) or other injured firms from
bringing their own suits. Their failure to do so suggests that their real
goal is to hinder Microsoft to their own benefit at mimimal expense to
themselves.
D. PREDATORY PRICING
Predatory pricing as an exclusionary tactic deserves special mention if
only because it has generated its own extensive literature. Posner listed it
as a specific abuse and hence a practice that many economists doubt can
236. Id. at 113.
237. Declaration of Kenneth J. Arrow (Jan. 17, 1995), appended to Memorandum of
the United States of America in Support of Motion to Enter Final Judgment and in Oppo-
sition to the Positions of IDE Corporation and Amici (Jan. 17, 1995), United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,027 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
238. Vita & Wellford, supra note 201, at 236. Liebowitz and Margolis conclude:
After we economists have had our fun, thinking about network effects and
considering how social interactions have a similarity to networks, we need to
acknowledge that the a priori case for network externalities is treacherous
and the empirical case is yet to be presented. Most constructs in economics
find their way only very slowly into either public policy or established theory.
The construct of network externalities should be one of them.
Liebowitz & Margolis, Network Externality, supra note 195, at 149 (emphasis in original).
In another article, they conclude,
It is a grand conceptual leap from observing a network effect to concluding
the existence of a socially relevant externality. So long as we have only the
vague impression that 'bigger is better' (or 'smaller is better'), we should be
slow to conclude that there are externalities of the sort that suggest the need
for social remedy.
Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 205.
239. Anonymous Amici Curiae Brief, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318
(D.D.C. 1995) (No. 94-1564).
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restrict output.240 Certainly the Chicago position historically has been
that predatory pricing is an unlikely means of exclusion because it re-
quires the predator to bear larger losses than the victim and recoupment
is improbable.241 Posner himself concluded that'predatory pricing is not
inevitably an irrational practice, for a predator that operates in several
markets may profit by expending considerable resources in destroying a
competitor in one market, thereby creating a reputation for predatory
pricing that will deter potential competitors from entering any of its mar-
kets.242 Moreover, he argued that forcing the mistaken predator, who in
fact could not succeed, to bear the costs of its attempt is efficient.243 But
he obviously viewed predatory pricing as a rare phenomenon that is hard
to identify and recognized that enforcement mistakes, by deterring vigor-
ous price competition, are socially costly.244
Posner's insight about the multi-market predator was, in modem termi-
nology, a claim about strategic firm behavior, and during the 1980s econ-
omists began to use game-theoretic concepts to analyze strategic behavior
and to construct formal models in which predatory pricing is rational.245
The implication of this literature is that predatory pricing is more preva-
lent, and hence more important, than analysts, including Posner, had
thought. The courts, including the Supreme Court, have been unim-
pressed. 246 The Court has embraced a model of predation in which the
predator expects to lose money during the predatory campaign, drive the
rival from the market, and more than recoup its losses thereafter. The
Court has focused on the prospects for recoupment, the "back-end" of
the scenario, and if the predator could not expect to profit, the prices will
be assumed to be nonpredatory.247 In its most recent case, the Court
implicitly rejected a strategic theory, deeming a claim that a firm with a
240. Posner, supra note 1, at 508 n.17. As support for the proposition that economists
doubt the efficacy of predatory pricing, Posner cites John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cut-
ting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958), and L.G. Telser, Cutthroat
Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J.L. & ECON. 259 (1966).
241. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 125, at 148-54.
242. POSNER, supra note 82, at 185-86.
243. Id. at 187-88.
244. Id. at 188-96.
245. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112-37 (Giacomo Bonanno
& Dario Brandolini eds., 1990); Janusz Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopoliza-
tion, and Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537-96 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989). For a succinct summary, see Alvin K. Klevorick,
The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 AM. ECON. REV.,
May 1993, at 162.
246. Indeed, Klevorick laments the fact that the insights of the new, game-theoretic
literature have not made their way into the judiciary's elaboration of the law of predatory
pricing. Id. at 165.
247. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2578 (1993); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). For a
description of the Court's approach, see A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d
1396, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990). See also Kenneth G.
Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoupment Standard in
Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 562-63 (1994).
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small market share would engage in predatory pricing and rely upon tacit
collusion to recoup losses so implausible as to warrant judgment for the
defendant as a matter. of law.248
Thus, neither a judicial nor an economic consensus would support de-
voting resources to a campaign against predatory pricing. Once again,
the practical significance of the new models is in dispute. Many econo-
mists continue to adhere to the view that "predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful." 249
V. CONCLUSION
Posner's policy synthesis of twenty-five years ago was remarkably pre-
scient and influential. Although his proposals on tacit collusion have not
been as fruitful as he hoped, they have focused attention on predisposing
characteristics in all cases involving horizontal restraints and exclusionary
practices. His recommendations for a more economically oriented
merger analysis have been largely accepted. And his skepticism about
single-firm monopolization has been borne out by experience.
Since Posner's proposal, economists have done a great deal of creative
work identifying potentially inefficient practices. Although this work
may help resolve special cases and may even result in liability, it has not
yet produced sufficiently strong generalizations about economic behavior
to justify a radical change in enforcement policy. No economic consensus
in the present literature supports governmental intervention, except in
special cases. Further, the present federal judiciary does not seem recep-
tive to the new theories of exclusion.
248. Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. 2578. For an argument that the Court did not consider
strategic arguments in Brooke Group and therefore did not reject them, see Jonathan B.
Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST
L.J. 585 (1994).
249. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. Recent commentary skeptical of the practical impor-
tance of predatory pricing includes Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Testing for Pre-
dation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1989); see also Milgrom &
Roberts, supra note 245, at 133-34; Donald J. Boudreaux et al., The Supreme Court's Pre-
dation Odyssey: From Fruit Pies to Cigarettes, 4 SuP. Cr. ECON. REV. (forthcoming 1995).
Older critiques include Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 289 (1980).
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